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1 Introduction
The birth of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has sparkled interest in the question
of how to conduct monetary and fiscal policy for a group of countries that share the
same currency. There is a growing body of research that has tried to assess this
issue within a fully micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium framework. However
literature relies on the existence of a supra-national authority to which all monetary
and fiscal policy decisions have been delegated. Yet, as matter of fact, in the EMU
only the monetary policy is under the control of a common authority, the European
Central Bank (ECB), whereas, even if bound by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
fiscal policies are still decided at national level. Consequently the following questions
arise: How should monetary and fiscal policies be conducted in a monetary union where
there is a common central bank but autonomous fiscal policies? Does this institutional
arrangement lead to different normative prescriptions with respect to those highlighted
by the previous literature?
In order to answer such questions, in this chapter I uses a generalized version of the
DSGE model laid out by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b)1 and compares two different policy
regimes: the regime of fiscal policy coordination considered as a benchmark, already
analyzed by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b) themselves, Beetsma and Jensen (2004) and
(2005)2 and the regime of fiscal policy no-coordination.
In our basic setup, the world is framed as a continuum of small open economies.
Each country government chooses the optimal provision of a public consumption good
and sets a time-invariant labour subsidy. The presence of lump sum taxes ensures com-
pliance with SGP limits and rules out the additional problem of choosing how to finance
optimally the public expenditure. Within this framework, under fiscal policy coordi-
nation, monetary and fiscal policies are chosen by a common policymaker in order to
maximize the average union welfare. Conversely, under fiscal policy no-coordination3,
there is a multiplicity of policy authorities each of them taking as given other policy-
makers’ decisions: governments that are concerned only about the welfare of their own
country and the central bank of the Monetary Union that has the maximization of the
average union welfare as objective.
According to my results, the no-coordination among fiscal authorities matters for
the design of both optimal monetary and fiscal policies. The driving force of this
1See also Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005a). Differently from Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b), not only final private
goods but even public goods and intermediate inputs are traded, while the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods is not restricted to be equal to one. Moreover in the preference specification
the intertemporal elasticities of substitution of public and private consumption are not necessarily equal.
As it will be clarified below, the first two generalizations strengthen the incentive of uncoordinated fiscal
policymakers to generate aggregate distortions. Conversely the last assumption is crucial to explain the
results in the case of shocks to technology.
2Even Ferrero (2005) contributed to this debate. He analyzed the case of coordination in which, however,
the exogenous government expenditure is financed through distortionary taxes and riskless bonds.
3There are some old contributions that consider the case of no-coordination (for instance Lambertini and
Dixit (2003)). However, in general these papers do not assume fully-micro-founded welfare criteria. An
exception in this respect is the work by Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). Yet they treat only marginally
the case of a monetary union and reach results opposite to those of this paper by assuming an efficient steady
state and considering only the case of optimal simple rules.
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finding stems from countries monopoly power on their terms of trade. Indeed, given
the imperfect substitutability between bundles produced in different countries, unco-
ordinated policymakers have an incentive to try to influence the terms of trade in
their favour. This incentive works both at the steady state and over the business cy-
cle4. At the steady state, independent fiscal authorities act as a monopolist. They
try to increase the demand of the home produced goods and to decrease their supply
by over-expanding government expenditure and reducing the labour subsidy. In this
way they seek to render domestic goods relatively more expensive in order to reduce
their production. In fact given that there is consumption risk sharing across coun-
tries, the increase in leisure associated with a terms of trade improvement more than
compensates the corresponding fall in consumption. In other words through a terms
of trade improvement governments seek to externalize labour effort to other countries
consumers.
Over the business cycle instead they use government expenditure to restrain the
terms of trade volatility and hence reduce the cost of the volatility of output or private
consumption at other countries’ expense.
This mechanism explains the differences in policy prescriptions under coordination
and no-coordination. Under the benchmark case of fiscal policy coordination, Gal´ı and
Monacelli (2005b), Beetsma and Jensen (2004) and (2005) have pointed out two main
findings. Firstly, under the optimal policy mix, the common monetary policy should
seek to stabilize the average union inflation following the same normative prescriptions
valid in a closed economy. Therefore, under technology shocks, it should pursue the
stability of the average union price level; under mark up shocks, it has to trade off
between stabilizing the average inflation and the average output gap. Secondly, in a
monetary union fiscal policy is a useful tool for macroeconomic stabilization of single
country economies. Indeed, at single country level fiscal policy should be employed to
stabilize the effects of idiosyncratic shocks given that, because of the adoption of the
common currency, the central bank is able only to stabilize the aggregate economy.
However, at the aggregate level fiscal policy should only ensure on average the efficient
provision of the public goods.
Under fiscal policy no-coordination, the previous results no longer hold. With re-
gard to monetary policy, the common central bank should cope with the aggregate
distortions generated both at the steady state and over the business cycle by indepen-
dent governments and not stabilize the average union economy as if it were a closed
economy. Therefore in the presence of productivity shocks strict inflation targeting is
in general not optimal. In fact, under flexible prices output volatility is inefficiently
high for the at least two reasons. On the one hand national authorities have an incen-
tive to manipulate the terms of trade to their own advantage even over the business
cycle. On the other hand the steady state government expenditure share in output
is inefficiently high and thus amplifies the effects of government expenditure shocks
on output fluctuations5. Moreover, in the response to mark up shocks, the monetary
4...as pointed out by the previous literature: see, among others, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Benigno and
Benigno (2003) and Epifani and Gancia (2005).
5...at least under the baseline calibration. Given the inefficiently high steady state government expenditure
share in output, one percentage increase in the government expenditure expands more output under no-
coordination than under coordination. ? has already emphasized that the government’s size may have an
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authority should be much more aggressive in fighting inflation under no-coordination
than under coordination. This finding is explained by the inefficiently low steady state
level of output. Given that distortion, an increase in output volatility in response to
mark up shocks has some beneficial effects because it makes consumers willing to work
more on average driving the economy, by so doing, towards the efficient allocation.
With regard to fiscal policies independent governments do not ensure on average,
given their incentives, the efficient provision of the public goods. And, in the case
of mark up shocks they use government expenditure for stabilization purposes even if
shocks are symmetric. Indeed, by taking as given what other policymakers are doing,
they do not realize that the common central bank is already stabilizing the aggregate
economy and they go on seeking to stabilize, on their own, the undesirable effects of
mark up shocks.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic framework. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 examines the case of full coor-
dination. Section 5 the case of no-coordination. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The currency union consists of a continuum of small open economies6. In each country
there are two sectors: a competitive sector that produces one final good by using both
home and foreign country intermediate inputs; a monopolistic competitive sector that
produces a continuum of intermediate differentiated goods by using as input labour
which is assumed immobile across countries.
2.1 Preferences
Preferences of a generic country representative household are defined over a private
consumption bundle, Ct, a public consumption bundle, Gt and hours of labour Nt(h)7:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G1−γt
1− γ −
Nt(h)ϕ+1
ϕ+ 1
]
0 < β < 1 (1)
where, as usual, β stands for the intertemporal preferences discount factor and χ is
the weight attached to public consumption. Agents consume all the goods produced in
the world economy. However preferences exhibit home bias. The private consumption
index is, in fact, a CES aggregation of the following type:
Ct ≡
[
(1− α) 1ηC
η−1
η
H,t + α
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
η > 0 (2)
with 1−α being the degree of home bias in the private consumption and η denoting the
elasticity of substitution between CH,t, and CF,t. CH,t represents the home household’s
effect on output volatility.
6The general framework draws on Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005a) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b).
7In this and in the following subsections we abstract from indexing the small open economy of reference.
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consumption of the single home final good while CF,t is a CES aggregation of the goods
produced in foreign countries namely:
CF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
C
η−1
η
j,t dj
] η
η−1
(3)
η then represents even the elasticity of substitution between different foreign goods.
The public bundle is defined similarly to the private bundle, that is:
Gt ≡
[
(1− ν) 1ηG
η−1
η
H,t + ν
1
ηG
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
η > 0 (4)
with
GF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
G
η−1
η
j,t dj
] η
η−1
(5)
where 1 − ν indicates the degree of home bias in the public consumption which, in
general, is allowed to be different from 1− α8.
Public and private consumption index definitions (2), (4), (3) and (5) allow to
determine consistent definitions of price indexes9. In particular, PC,t and PG,t, the
private and the public consumers’ price indexes10 are given by:
PC,t ≡
[
(1− α)P 1−ηt + αP ∗t 1−η
] 1
1−η (6)
PG,t ≡
[
(1− ν)P 1−ηt + νP ∗t 1−η
] 1
1−η (7)
with P ∗t being specified as:
P ∗t ≡
[∫ 1
0
P jt
1−η
dj
] 1
1−η
(8)
Thus Pt and P
j
t are producers’ price indexes
11. There are no trading frictions being
the law of one price assumed to hold in all single good markets. However, given the
home biased preferences, the purchasing power parity does not hold for indexes PC,t
and PG,t.
2.2 Consumption demand, portfolio choices and labour
supply
The consumption and price index definitions allow to solve the consumer problem in
three stages. In the first two stages, agents decide how much real net income to allocate
8In fact Bru¨lhart and Trionfetti (2004) point out that the home bias of public goods is higher than home
bias of private goods.
9Namely price and consumption indexes are such that at the optimum expenditures for total consumption
of both private and public goods, PtCH,t+
∫ 1
0
P jt Cj,tdj and PtGH,t+
∫ 1
0
P jt Gj,tdj are equal respectively to
PC,tCt and PG,tGt.
10In what follows, CPI stands for consumers’ price index.
11Again in what follows, PPI stands for producers’ price index.
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to buy goods produced at home and abroad. According to the set of optimal conditions,
it is possible to determine agent demands for CH,t, CF,t and Cj,t, as:
CH,t = (1− α)
(
Pt
PC,t
)−η
Ct CF,t = α
(
P ∗t
PC,t
)−η
Ct Cj,t =
(
P jt
P ∗t
)−η
CF,t (9)
for all j. The third stage coincides with the standard consumer problem. Agents are
monopolistic competitive labour suppliers. Thus they maximize (1) with respect to Ct,
Dt+1 and Nt(h) subject to the following sequence of constraints:
Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Dt +Wt(h)Nt(h)− PC,tCt + Tt (10)
Nt(h) =
(
Wt(h)
Wt
)−υt
Nt (11)
where:
Wt ≡
[∫ 1
0
Wt(h)1−υtdh
] 1
1−υt
(12)
Constraint (10) is the budget constraints which states that nominal saving, net of
lump sum transfers, has to equalize the nominal value of a state contingent portfolio.
In fact Wt(h) stands for the per hour nominal wage, Qt,t+1 denotes what is usually
called the stochastic discount factor and Dt+1 is the payoff of one maturity portfolio
that includes firm shares.
Constraint (11) is a consequence of a CES aggregation of labour inputs which will
be specified in the next sub-section and implicitly assumes that the elasticity of demand
of labour, υt, is time-varying but equal across agents as in Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler
(2002). Finally (12) is simply the aggregate wage index. Domestic and international
markets are assumed to be complete.
By the optimality conditions of the household problem:
(1 + µt)Nt(h)ϕCσt =
Wt
PC,t
(13)
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ ( PC,t
PC,t+1
)
= Qt,t+1 (14)
which hold in all states of nature and at all periods and where µt ≡ 1υt−1 .
According to (13), workers set the real wage as mark up over the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure, while the value of the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution of consumption should equalize the stochastic discount
factor. Notice that since wages are perfectly flexible Nt(h)=Nt and Wt(h)=Wt for all
h and t.
2.3 Final good aggregate demand
In each country the demand for the final good is the sum of four components: the
demands of domestic and foreign households and governments namely:
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Yt = CH,t +
∫ 1
0
CjH,tdj +GH,t +
∫ 1
0
GjH,tdj (15)
Condition (15) can be rewritten as:
Yt = (1−α)
(
Pt
PC,t
)−η
Ct+α
∫ 1
0
(
Pt
P jC,t
)−η
Cjt dj+(1−ν)
(
Pt
PG,t
)−η
Gt+ν
∫ 1
0
(
Pt
P jG,t
)−η
Gjtdj
(16)
which follows from equation (3)12 and the fact that:
GH,t = (1−ν)
(
Pt
PG,t
)−η
Gt GF,t = ν
(
P ∗t
PG,t
)−η
Gt Gj,t =
(
P jt
P ∗t
)−η
GF,t (17)
for all j. According to (17) independently of the aggregate level of Gt, governments
choose good demands by minimizing the total expenditure PtGH,t +
∫ 1
0 P
j
t Gj,tdj.
2.4 Firms and technology in the final good sector
Each final good is produced by using both home and foreign inputs according to the
following CES technology:
Yt =
[
(1− ψ) 1η (Y IH,t) η−1η + ψ 1η (Y IF,t) η−1η ] ηη−1 η > 0 (18)
where 1− ψ is the degree of home bias in intermediate goods. Y IH and Y IF are defined
as:
Y IH,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
yIH,t(k)
) ε−1
ε dk
] ε
ε−1
Y IF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
Y Ij,t
) η−1
η dj
] η
η−1
(19)
with Y Ij,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
yIj,t(k)
) ε−1
ε
dk
] ε
ε−1
for all j and yIH,t(k) and y
I
j,t(k) being the demands
for the k type of intermediate good produced in the home country and in country j
respectively.
The final sector is perfectly competitive. Therefore firms maximize profits taking
Pt, the price of the final good, as given. The optimality conditions of this problem lead
to the following single and aggregate input demands:
yIH,t(k) =
(
pH,t(k)
PH,t
)−ε
Y IH,t y
I
j,t(k) =
(
pj,t(k)
Pj,t
)−ε
Y Ij,t (20)
Y IH,t = (1− ψ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Yt Y
I
F,t = ψ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Yt Y
I
j,t =
(
Pj,t
PF,t
)−η
Y IF,t
(21)
12... with the symmetric equations for foreign countries.
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which allow to determine consistently the price indexes for final and intermediate goods
as:
Pt =
[
(1− ψ) (PH,t)1−η + ψ (PF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η (22)
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
pH,t(k)1−εdk
] 1
1−ε
PF,t =
[∫ 1
0
(Pj,t)
1−η dj
] 1
1−η
Pj,t =
[∫ 1
0
pj,t(k)1−εdk
] 1
1−ε
(23)
where pj,t(k) is the price of intermediate input k produced in country j.
2.5 Intermediate good aggregate demand
The demand for home intermediate goods is generated by the demands of both home
and foreign final good producers, namely:
yH,t(k) ≡ yIH,t(k) +
∫ 1
0
yI,jH,t(k)dj (24)
Condition (24) can be rewritten as:
yH,t(k) =
(
pH,t(k)
PH,t
)−ε [
(1− ψ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Yt + ψ
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t
P jt
)−η
Y jt dj
]
(25)
which follows from equations (20) and (21)13. Given (25) it is possible to recover the
aggregate demand YH,t ≡
(∫ 1
0 (yH,t(k))
ε−1
ε dk
) ε
ε−1 . In fact by properly integrating (25)
we obtain:
YH,t =
[
(1− ψ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Yt + ψ
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t
P jt
)−η
Y jt dj
]
(26)
2.6 Firm technology and price setting in the intermediate
good sector
In the intermediate sector each firm produces a single differentiated good with a con-
stant return to scale technology of the type:
yH,t(k) = AtNt(k) (27)
with Nt(k) =
[∫ 1
0 Nt(h)
υt−1
υt dh
] υt
υt−1
and being the labour input and At the specific
country technology shock. Given (27) and the fact that Nt = Nt(h) for all h, the
aggregate relationship between output and labour can be read as:
Nt =
YH,t
At
Zt (28)
13... with the symmetric equations for foreign countries.
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where Zt ≡
∫ 1
0
yH,t(k)
YH,t
dk, and Nt ≡
∫ 1
0 Nt(k)dk. Given (24) and (26) then Zt ≡∫ 1
0
(
pH,t(k)
PH,t
)−ε
dk; thus Zt can be interpreted as an index of the relative price dispersion
across firms. We assume that good prices adjust according to a staggered mechanism
a` la Calvo. Therefore in each period a given firm can reoptimize its price only with
probability 1− θ. As a result the fraction of firms that set a new price is fixed and the
aggregate producer price index of the intermediate goods evolves accordingly to:
P
(1−ε)
H,t = θP
(1−ε)
H,t−1 + (1− θ)p˜H,t(k)
(1−ε)
(29)
with p˜H,t(k) being the optimal price. Firms maximize the discounted expected sum
of the future profits that would be collected if the optimal price could not be changed
namely:
∞∑
s=0
(θ)sEt
{
Qt,t+syH,t+s(k)
[
p˜H,t(k)−MCnt+s
]}
(30)
where yH,t(k) is given by (25) and MCnt =
(1−τ)Wt
At
is the nominal marginal cost
with τ indicating a labour subsidy distributed to firms by the fiscal authority which
is not supposed to vary over the business cycle. Taking into account (14) and that
MCt ≡ MC
n
t
PH,t
, the optimality condition of the firm problem can be written as:
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
{
C−σt+s
(
p˜H,t(k)
PH,t+s
)−ε
YH,t+s
PH,t
PC,t+s
[
p˜H,t(k)
PH,t
− ε
ε− 1
PH,t+s
PH,t
MCt+s
]}
= 0
(31)
Condition (31) states implicitly that firms reset their prices as a mark up over a
weighted average of the current and expected marginal costs, where the weight of
the expected marginal cost at some date t + s depends on the probability that the
price is still effective at that date.
3 Equilibrium
The purpose of this section is twofold: on the one hand to recover the full set of
conditions necessary and sufficient to determine the equilibrium of the monetary union;
on the other hand to rewrite the single country equilibrium conditions in terms only of
single country and average union variables. Indeed in this way, it is possible to simplify
the fiscal policy problem under no-coordination. Being infinitesimally small, single
country behaviour does not affect the average union performance. As a consequence,
under no-coordination, the fiscal policy problem can be formulated just considering
single country (and not the full set of the monetary union) equilibrium conditions.
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3.1 International risk sharing
Under complete markets14, condition (14) and the corresponding conditions for other
countries imply:
P jC,t
PC,t
=
(
Cjt
Ct
)−σ
(32)
for all j and where P jC,t denotes the consumer price index of country j.
Notice that P ∗t =
[∫ 1
0 (P
j
C,t)
1−ηdj
] 1
1−η and let:
C∗t ≡
[∫ 1
0
(Cjt )
σ(η−1)dj
] 1
σ(η−1)
(33)
By properly integrating (32) we obtain:
P ∗t
PC,t
=
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ
(34)
Equation (32) and its aggregate version (34) state that, under complete markets, the
marginal rate of substitution between home and other country consumption (or the
average union consumption) has to be equal to the corresponding relative price. As
a result, in equilibrium, any increase in the home relative to foreign CPI goes with a
decrease of home relative to foreign consumption. Indeed a terms of trade improvement
in the home country15 induces private agents to reallocate the consumption between
home and foreign goods. Then, because of the home bias, the home country consumers
would decrease the total private consumption more than foreigners 16 .
By combining (34) with (6), (7) and (22) and considering that P ∗t = PF,t, it follows
that:
Pt
PC,t
=
[
1
1− α −
α
1− α
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ(1−η)] 11−η
(35)
PG,t
PC,t
=
[
(1− ν) Pt
PC,t
1−η
+ ν
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ(1−η)] 11−η
(36)
PH,t
Pt
=
[
1
1− ψ −
ψ
1− ψ
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ(1−η)( Pt
PC,t
)η−1] 11−η
(37)
which say that all the single country relative prices Pt/PC,t, PG,t/PC,t and PH,t/Pt
14...and the assumption that the state contingent wealth at time zero is such that the lifetime discounted
budget constraints are identical across agents.
15Namely the prices of the foreign goods in terms of home goods.
16In fact because of the home bias, even if there are complete markets, private agents consumption is not
equal across countries.
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and the terms of trade P ∗/Pt and P ∗t /PH,t 17 are function exclusively of the difference
between single country and average union private consumption.
In addition given (14) and (34):(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
Π∗t+1
−1 =
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
Π−1C,t+1 (38)
with Π∗t ≡ P ∗t /P ∗t−1 and ΠC,t ≡ PC,t/PC,t−1.
Thus in equilibrium the value of intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of
private consumption should be equal across countries. This last condition combined
with (35) and (37) can be log-linearized as:
piH,t − pi∗t = −ω4 (∆cˆt −∆cˆ∗t ) (39)
where ω4 ≡ σ(1−α)(1−ψ) 18 . (38) (39) relate consumption variations differential from the
union average to the domestic inflation differential. Moreover under complete markets,
from conditions (14) and (34) it follows:
1
1 + r∗t
= βEt
{(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ ( P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)}
(40)
where 11+r∗t = Et{Qt,t+1}. When markets are complete, the expected value of the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of private consumption, namely the price
of a riskless portfolio, should be equal to the price of the riskless bond, being r∗t the
nominal interest rate.
The log-linear approximation of condition (40) leads to:
cˆ∗t = Et{cˆ∗t+1} −
1
σ
(r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − %) (41)
where % ≡ −logβ. Condition (41) is the so called IS curve that relates the average
union intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of private consumption with the real
interest rate.
By(38), (40) can be read as:
1
1 + r∗t
= βEt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ ( PC,t
PC,t+1
)}
(42)
In other words by (38) (41) is satisfied even at the single country level19. For this
reason we can interpret (38) as a constraint imposed by the adoption of a common cur-
rency according to which in response to asymmetric shocks the terms of trade cannot
adjust instantaneously because of the sluggish prices adjustment and the fix exchange
17In fact by (6) and (22), PC,t/Pt =
[
(1− α) + α (P ∗t /Pt)(1−η)
] 1
1−η and Pt/PH,t =
[
(1− ψ) + ψ (P ∗t /PH,t)(1−η)] 11−η .
P ∗t /Pt and P ∗t /PH,t are the so called effective terms of trade. In what follows, unless specified differently, we
will refer only to the effective terms of trade.
18From now on the following conventions are used: xˆt stands for the log deviation of Xt from the symmetric
zero inflation steady state while ∆xˆt ≡ xˆt − xˆt−1 and xˆ∗t ≡
∫ 1
0
xˆitdi.
19However (38) is not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition for (42) to be satisfied given (40).
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rates. Actually outside a monetary union, under flexible exchange rates (38) and (41)
do not necessarily hold because the fluctuations of nominal exchange rates themselves
assure the equality of the value of intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of pri-
vate consumption and give reason of differences in the nominal interest rates across
countries.
3.2 Good market clearing conditions
To rewrite the resource constraints as function of only aggregate variables, note that
Pt/P
j
C,t = (Pt/PC,t)(PC,t/P
j
C,t). Similarly Pt/P
j
G,t = (Pt/PC,t) (PC,t/P
j
C,t)(P
j
C,t/P
j
G,t)
and PH,tP
j
t = (PH,t/Pt)(Pt/PC,t)(PC,t/P
j
C,t)(P
j
C,t/Pj,t). Then by substituting (32) in
(??) and (26) we can express the good market clearing conditions as:
Yt =
(
Pt
PC,t
)−η [
(1− α)Ct + αCσηt Υ1−σηC,t + (1− ν)
(
PC,t
PG,t
)−η
Gt + νC
ση
t Υ
1−ση
G,t
]
(43)
YH,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η [
(1− ψ)Yt + ψ
(
Pt
PC,t
)−η
Cσηt Υ
1−ση
Y,t
]
(44)
where:
ΥC,t ≡
[∫ 1
0 C
j
t
1−ση
dj
] 1
1−ση
ΥG,t ≡
[∫ 1
0 C
j
t
−ση
(
P jC,t
P jG,t
)−η
Gjtdj
] 1
1−ση
ΥY,t ≡
[∫ 1
0 C
j
t
−ση
(
P jC,t
Pj,t
)−η
Y jt dj
] 1
1−ση
(45)
Rewriting the good market clearing conditions in this way lead to the following
considerations. If isolated, any change in the home terms of trade20 does not affect
the demands for final and intermediate goods of other countries as long the aggregate
variables are given. This is because countries are assumed to be small21. At the same
time any improvement in the home terms of trade makes private agents willing to
switch expenditure from home to foreign goo ds22.
The log-linear approximations of the resource constraints (43) and (44) and of
conditions (35), (36) and (37) allow to retrieve the following condition:
yˆH,t +
ψ
1− ψ (yˆH,t − yˆ
∗
t ) = ρcˆt + ρ(δ − 1)(cˆt − cˆ∗t ) + (1− ρ)gˆt − (1− ρ)ν(gˆt − gˆ∗t ) (46)
where δ ≡ (1−ψ) [(1− α) + δ1 + δ2(1− ρ)/(ρ) + δ3(1)/(δ)] ρ ≡ CY , δ1 ≡ [(1− α) + ξα(2− α)],
δ2 ≡ [ξν(2− ν)], δ3 ≡ [ξψ(2− ψ)] /(1− ψ) and ξ ≡ ησ/(1− α)
20namely P ∗t /Pt and P
∗
t /PH,t
21To see why this is true it is sufficient to consider the analogous of condition (43) for a given foreign
country.
22what in the literature is called the switching expenditure effect.
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3.3 The Phillips curve
Given condition (??) the optimal price is determined as:
p˜H,t(k)
PH,t
=
Kt
Ft
(47)
with:
Kt ≡
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
[
C−σt+sYH,t+s
(
PH,t+s
PH,t
)ε PH,t+s
PC,t+s
ε
ε− 1MCt+s
]
(48)
Ft ≡
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)sEt
[
C−σt+sYH,t+s
(
PH,t+s
PH,t
)ε−1 PH,t+s
PC,t+s
]
(49)
which can be read as:
Kt = C−σt YH,t
PH,t
PC,t
ε
ε− 1MCt + βθEt
{
ΠεH,t+sKt+1
}
(50)
Ft = C−σt YH,t
PH,t
PC,t
+ βθEt
{
Πε−1H,t+1Ft+1
}
(51)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 . Following Benigno and Woodford (2004), from (47) and (29)
we can retrieve the next conditions:
1− θΠε−1H,t
1− θ =
(
Ft
Kt
)ε−1
(52)
Zt = θZt−1ΠεH,t + (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1H,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
(53)
which determines the law of motion of firms price dispersion. From the log linear
approximation of (??) (48) (49) and (53):
piH,t = λm̂ct + βEt{piH,t+1} (54)
where:
m̂ct = (ŵt − pˆc,t)− (p̂t − pˆc,t)− (p̂H,t − pˆt)− aˆt (55)
= ϕyˆH,t + σcˆt + ω4((1− ψ)α+ ψ)(cˆt − cˆ∗t )− (1 + ϕ)aˆt + µˆt
Condition (54) is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve direct consequence of the Calvo
mechanism. As usual, current domestic inflation depends on the expectation on future
domestic inflation and the current real marginal cost of producing intermediate goods.
Being the economy open, in equilibrium that cost is determined by the real wage
(which is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure),
the labour productivity and the relative prices of intermediate and final goods. These
prices are determined as made clear by (35) and (37) by the differences of private
consumption from the average.
The rational expectation stochastic equilibrium of the monetary union is then de-
fined as the sequence of {Cit , Y it , Y iH,t, ΠiH,t, Zit , F it , Kit }∞t=0 for all i which, given {Git
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, r∗t }∞t=0 for all i, τ and the initial condition Z−1, satisfies (??), (50), (51),(52), (53),
(43), (44) (38) and (40) for all i where P it /P
i
C,t, P
i
G,t/P
i
C,t, P
i
H,t/P
i
t are determined
according to (35), (36), (37).
What it is still missing is to determine the optimal monetary and fiscal policies.
This is the objective of the next paragraphs.
4 The optimal policies
As mentioned in the introduction, the optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix is
analysed under two different policy regimes: the regimes of coordination and no-
coordination. Under coordination there is a common authority responsible for both
monetary and fiscal policies which has the maximization of the average union welfare
as objective. Under no-coordination there is a plurality of independent policymak-
ers each of those takes other policy authorities’ decisions as given. The central bank
on the one hand which seeks to minimize the average losses of union households and
the governments on the other hand which, conversely, which conversely are concerned
about the average losses of the single country households. The solutions to the op-
timal policy problems under both regimes are derived by using the linear quadratic
approach proposed by Benigno and Woodford (2004). This methodology requires to
assume that policies are optimal from timeless perspective23 and can be implemented
as follows. First the zero-inflation deterministic steady state is retrieved; then a purely
quadratic approximation to the single country and monetary union welfare around the
deterministic steady state is obtained. Being the economies open and in the case of no-
coordination the deterministic steady state distorted, these approximations are derived
by using the second order approximations of the structural equations24. Finally, given
the purely quadratic approximations of policymakers’ objectives, the optimal policies25
are recovered by using as constraints the equilibrium conditions approximated up to
the first order.
4.1 The case of coordination
Under coordination the optimal policy problem of the common authority can be for-
mulated as the maximization of:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
Cit1−σ
1− σ + χ
Git
1−γ
1− γ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y iH,t
Ait
)ϕ+1 di (56)
with respect to Cit , G
i
t, Y
i
t , Y
i
H,t, Π
i
H,t, Z
i
t , F
i
t and K
i
t for all i, subject to equilibrium
conditions (??), (38), (43), (44), (50), (51), (52), and (53) for all i where P it /P
i
C,t,
23See also Benigno and Benigno (2006), Benigno and De Paoli (2005) and Paoli (2004).
24If second order approximation of a policymaker objective contain a linear term, then the constraint to
the policy problem should be approximated up to the second order.
25In the case of no-coordination, the Nash equilibrium policies are determined by the solutions to both
the monetary and fiscal policy problems.
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P iG,t/P
i
C,t, P
i
H,t/P
i
t are determined according to (35), (36), (37). It is easy to show
that the symmetric zero inflation deterministic steady state26 reduces to the following
system of equations:
C−σ = Y ϕ (57)
χG−γ = Y ϕ (58)
Y = C +G (59)
where A = 1. Under coordination and in absence of shocks, the allocation chosen
by the common policymaker is determined by three conditions: the first two that
equate the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between both private consump-
tion and leisure and public consumption and leisure to the corresponding rates of
transformation(MRT ) and the third one, the resource constraint, that equates the pri-
vate and public demands for final goods to the relative supply. In order to implement
this allocation, the policy maker should provide an efficient level of public goods as
embodied in (57)-(59), and use the steady state subsidy on labor in order to completely
offset the distortion due to monopolistic competition. This ensures that in the case of
coordination the steady state allocation is Pareto efficient.
As shown in the appendix, under coordination the average welfare of union house-
holds can be approximated as follows:
−1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
[ ε
λ
(piiH,t)
2 + ϕ(y˜c,iH,t)
2 + γ(1− ρ)(g˜c,it )2 + σρ(c˜c,it )2 (60)
+2(1− ρ)(1− ν)ς1(g˜c,it − g˜c,∗t )(c˜c,it − c˜c,∗t ) + ς3(c˜c,it − c˜c,∗t )2
]
di+ s.o.t.i.p. (61)
where ς1 ≡ ξ(ν+ψ), ξ ≡ ησ1−α , ς3 is properly defined in appendix and x˜tc,i ≡ xˆit− xˆc,it
where xˆc,it indicates the target of the common authority under coordination. Notice
that by (35), (36) and (37), cˆti − cˆt∗ is perfectly negative correlated with the terms of
trade.
According to (60), under coordination, welfare losses are increasing in inflation,
output, private consumption and public expenditure gaps. At the same time, these
losses are affected by the gaps of terms of trade and the consequent mis-allocation
in private consumption, public expenditure and production which crucially depends
on the different degrees of openness and the elasticity of substitution among bundles
produced in different country.
Under coordination, the target of the union policymaker is the first best and corre-
sponds to the flexible price allocation floating exchange rates and technology shocks:
26See the appendix.
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−γgˆc,it − (ϕyˆc,iH,t − (ϕ+ 1)ait) = (1− ρ)−1ς1(1− ν)(cˆc,it − cˆc,∗t ) (62)
−σcˆc,it + γgˆc,it = (63)
−(1− ρ)−1ς1(1− ν)(cˆc,it − cˆc,∗t ) + ρ−1
[
ς1(1− ρ)(1− ν)(gˆc,it − gˆc,∗t ) + ς3(cˆc,it − cˆc,∗t )
]
yˆc,iH,t +
ψ
1− ψ (yˆ
c,i
H,t − yˆc,∗t ) = (64)
ρ
ˆ
cc,it + (δ − 1)ρ(cˆc,it − cˆc,∗t ) + (1− ρ)gˆc,it − ν(1− ρ)(gˆc,it − gˆc,∗t )
The difference across countries embodied in (62)- (64) are explained as efficient
response to asymmetric technological shocks. In fact, if, for instance, its technological
shock is above the average union shock, then a single country economy experiences a
terms of trade worsening that efficiently increases home demand labor relative to those
of other countries. However, once the system (62) - (64) is integrated:
ϕyˆc,∗t + σcˆ
c,∗
t = (1 + ϕ)a
∗
t γgˆ
c,∗
t = σcˆ
c,∗
t yˆ
c,∗
t = ρcˆ
c,∗
t + (1− ρ)gˆc,∗t (65)
Thus, under coordination, the target of the common authority on average corre-
sponds exactly to that in a closed economy 27. Moreover, given (62) - (64), the set of
constraints relevant for the optimal policy problem can be rewritten as:
y˜c,iH,t +
ψ
1− ψ (y˜
c,i
H,t − y˜c,∗t ) = ρc˜tc,i + (δ − 1)ρ(c˜c,it − c˜c,∗t ) + (1− ρ)g˜i,ct − ν(1− ρ)(g˜c,it − g˜c,∗t )
(66)
piiH,t = λ
[
ϕy˜c,iH,t + σc˜
c,i
t + ω4((1− ψ)α+ ψ)(c˜c,it − c˜c,∗t )
]
+ βEt{piiH,t+1}+ λµˆit (67)
piiH,t − pi∗t = −ω4(∆c˜c,it −∆c˜c,∗t )− ω4(∆υi1,t −∆υ∗1,t) (68)
for all t and all i, where υi1,t ≡ cˆc,it . This system of equations makes clear which
are the tradeoffs of the common policymaker under coordination. At the union level
the only tradeoff is generated by the presence of aggregate markup shocks. To see why
this is true, it is sufficient to integrate the constrains (66)-(68) and consider that if the
average union inflation is completely stabilised then the average union marginal costs
is as well stabilised at the desired level. Thus , not surprisingly, according to the first
order conditions of the optimal policy problem28 in absence of markup shocks:
pi∗t = y˜
c,∗
t = c˜
c,∗
t = g˜
c,∗
t = 0 (69)
for all t which implies that ϕyˆ∗t + σcˆ∗t = (1 + ϕ)at and γgˆ∗t = σcˆ∗t . In other words
under coordination, the optimal policy entails a strict targeting of the average union
inflation in order to replicate on average the flexible price allocation.
27where the only existing distortion is due to price stickiness.
28See the appendix.
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However, at the single country level, there is another tradeoff, direct consequence of
adopting a common currency. As emphasized by (68), if the nominal exchange rates are
fix and prices are sticky , the terms of trade cannot adjust instantaneously in response to
asymmetric shocks and the flexible prices allocation cannot be implemented. Therefore,
as long as shocks are asymmetric, in general:
piiH,t 6= 0 (70)
for all i for some t and the government expenditure can be used as a stabilizatio tool29.
5 The case of no-coordination
Under no-coordination, fiscal authorities are not coordinated neither among each other
nor with the common central bank. The monetary and fiscal policy problems are then
formulated as follows.
Single country governments maximize the welfare of the small open economy rep-
resentative agent:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G1−γt
1− γ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
YH,t
At
)ϕ+1]
(71)
with respect to Ct, Yt, YH,t, ΠH,t, Zt, Ft and Kt, subject to the single country
equilibrium conditions (??), (38), (43), (44), (50), (51), (52), and (53) where Pt/PC,t,
PG,t/PC,t, PH,t/Pt are determined according to (35), (36), (37). 30 and taking as given
the union average variables including the nominal interest rate chosen by the common
central bank31.
Conversely, the monetary authority maximizes the average union welfare namely:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
Cit1−σ
1− σ + χ
Git
1−γ
1− γ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y iH,t
Ait
)ϕ+1 di (72)
with respect to Cit , Y
i
t , Y
i
H,t, Π
i
H,t, Z
i
t , F
i
t and K
i
t for all i, subject to equilibrium
conditions (??), (38), (43), (44), (50), (51), (52), and (53) for all i, where P it /P
i
C,t,
P iG,t/P
i
C,t, P
i
H,t/P
i
t are determined according to (35), (36), (37) and taken as given the
fiscal policies32.
Given the formulation of the monetary and fiscal policy problems, it can be shown
that at the symmetric deterministic steady state, zero inflation is a Nash equilibrium
policy33. In particular, the optimality conditions evaluated at the zero inflation steady
29These results have been highlighted by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b).
30...and the constraints that render the problem timeless as in Benigno and Woodford (2004).
31Namely C∗t ,ΥC,t, ΥG,t and ΥY,t.
32Namely Git and τ
i for all countries and in all periods. Notice that differently from governments, the
common central bank takes into account the effects that a marginal change of Cit and Y
i
t produces on C
∗
t
ΥC,t, ΥG,t and ΥY,t.
33See the appendix.
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state lead to:
C−σ = (1− ψ)
[
δ1 + δ2
G
C
+ δ3
Y
C
]
Y ϕ (73)
χG−γ = (1− ψ)(1− ν)Y ϕ (74)
Y = C +G (75)
where A = 1 and:
δ1 ≡ [ξα(2− α) + (1− α)] δ2 ≡ [ξν(2− ν)] δ3 ≡ 1(1−ψ) [ξψ(2− ψ)].
The comparison between this systems of equations (73) - (75) and (57) - (59) makes
clear that, when uncoordinated, fiscal policymakers have an incentive to generate static
distortions. Indeed if at the symmetric steady state, in the case of coordination, the
MRS between both leisure and private consumption and leisure and public expenditure
are set equal to the correspondent MRT, in the case of no-coordination are respectively
determined as (1− ψ) [δ1 + δ2GC + δ3 YC ] and (1− ψ)(1− ν).
The reason underlying this outcome is the following. As usual the optimal policy
is chosen by equating the marginal benefit of an additional unit of private and public
consumption with the marginal cost of labor effort necessary to produce that unit.
Nevertheless, under no-coordination this cost includes only the marginal change in
the labor effort of home country workers and not that of foreign countries workers34
as the common authority under coordination does. Ignoring this external effect on
other countries’ welfare is what bring about the incentive for non-coordinated fiscal
authorities to exert their monopoly power on its terms of trade. In fact, an autonomous
government would consider that by decreasing the home private consumption, could
generate in equilibrium a terms of trade improvement, reducing in this way the demands
for home produced goods35 and the labor effort necessary to match that demand36
For this reason non-coordinated fiscal policymaker prefers to over-expand the public
expenditure and renders labor more expensive37 in order to lower through the substi-
tution effect private consumption. As long as the actions of the other fiscal authorities
are taken as given, rendering home produced goods more expansive increases the profits
revenue of households and makes up for the decrease in labor income and the increase
in lump-sum taxes. Then households can consume more public goods and work less
than under coordination. The decrease in private consumption is then more than com-
pensated by the increase in the provision of public goods and the decrease of labor
34This is because countries are small and under no-coordination take the actions of the other policymakers
as given.
35As emphasized before, this is a direct consequence of the complete market assumption: in equilibrium
the marginal rate of substitution between the single private consumption and the average union private
consumption should be equal to the corresponding relative price.
36Conversely the coordinated authority would also take into account how, by improving the home terms
of trade, the same decrease in the home private consumption in equilibrium increase the demands for foreign
goods and the labor effort of foreigners.
37..with respect to the efficient levels and thank to the steady state labor subsidy.
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effort. This is a way in which countries seek to externalize both the costs of production
and taxation38. Obviously given that at the symmetric steady state everybody is doing
the same, in equilibrium the prices of all goods are the same and everybody is worse
off.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the inefficiency generated at the steady state by
uncoordinated policies it is sufficient to look at the following table:
Coordination no-coordination
C
Y 0.97 0.73
Under the baseline calibration, according to which α = 0.4, ν = 0.2 and ψ = 0.439,
if fiscal policies are not coordinated the steady state consumption output ratio is equal
to the 73% (as in the European Monetary Union) whereas, if they are coordinated, it
reaches 97%. In other words the steady state distribution of resources between private
and public sector under no-coordination is highly inefficient. And as it will be clear in
the next subsections this static distortion will be key even in determining the effects
that that lack of coordination produces over the business cycle.
5.1 Fiscal policy
For the fiscal policymaker the single country welfare has been approximated as:
−1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ε
λ
(piH,t)2 + ϕ(y˜
f
H,t)
2 + (1− ρ)(1− ψ)(1− ν)γ(g˜tf )2 + (ρ(1− ψ)δσ + ς2)(c˜tf )2
+2(1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ξνψ)g˜tf c˜tf
]
+ t.i.f.p.
where ς2 is properly determined in the appendix, t.i.f.p stands for terms indepen-
dent of fiscal policy, x˜ft ≡ xˆt − xˆft and xˆft indicates the target of the fiscal authority.
Variables, target and weights that enter in this loss are different with respect to the
case of coordination. Fiscal policymakers takes as given the average union allocation
and weight more private variations in the private consumption gap and less that in
the public expenditure. In the perspective of the independent governments , variations
in the gaps of private consumption are more expansive because of their effects on the
terms of trade, while those in public expenditure cost less because the external effects
produced on the welfare of the other countries are not taken into account.
The target of the fiscal authority corresponds to the flexible price allocation in the
hypotheses that fiscal policymakers are not coordinated and can use over the business
38In fact at the steady state the incentive to over-expand the government expenditure is present even when
the labor supply is completely inelastic.
39and that will be discussed in details below.
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cycle a labour subsidy as a policy instrument. This allocation is determined as:
−γgˆft − (ϕyˆfH,t − (ϕ+ 1)at) = (1− ψ)−1(ς1 − ψν)(cˆft − cˆ∗t ) (76)
−σcˆft − (ϕyˆfH,t − (ϕ+ 1)at) = ((1− ψ)ρδ)−1
[
(1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ψν)(gˆft − gˆ∗t )
+ς2(cˆ
f
t − cˆ∗t ) + (1− ψ)δ3(yˆ∗t − cˆ∗t ) + (1− ψ)(1− ρ)δ2(gˆ∗t − cˆ∗t )
]
(77)
yˆfH,t +
ψ
1− ψ (yˆ
f
H,t − yˆ∗t ) =
ρcˆft + (δ − 1)ρ(cˆft − cˆ∗t ) + (1− ρ)gˆft − ν(1− ρ)(gˆft − gˆ∗t ) (78)
Notice that, in contrast with both the common authority under coordination and
the central bank of the monetary union under no-coordination, uncoordinated govern-
ments take the average fluctuations of output, government expenditure and private
consumption as exogenous40.
The system (76) and (78) gives some insights on which are the incentives of the fiscal
policymakers and the potential aggregate effects produced by their policy choices. To
better understand the sources of these effects, let’s restrict to symmetric technological
shocks.
Under symmetric shocks, if implemented, the target of uncoordinated governments
is determined by the following conditions:
ϕyˆft + γgˆ
f
t = (1 + ϕ)a
∗
t (79)
δρ(γgˆft − σcˆft ) = (1− ψ)δ3(yˆft − cˆft ) + (1− ψ)(1− ρ)δ2(gˆft − cˆft ) (80)
yˆft = ρcˆ
f
t + (1− ρ)gˆft (81)
According to both these conditions and condition (65), two are the channels through
which the lack of coordination causes distortions at the average union level even over
the business cycle.
The first channel works through the steady state public expediture output ratio
namely (1− ρ)41. As already pointed out under no-coordination (1− ρ) is inefficiently
high because at the steady state both public expenditure is over-expanded and output
under-produced. Under the baseline calibration, this static distortion carries a clear
consequence: it inefficiently amplifies the impact of the government expenditure shocks
over output fluctuations. Indeed if the government expenditure-output ratio is too high
(meaning that private consumption-output ratio is too low), then one percent increase
in the government expenditure (private consumption) would expand more (less) out-
put under no-coordination than under coordination. But according to the baseline
calibration, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the government expenditure,
γ, is smaller than that of private consumption, σ. Hence over the cycles policymak-
ers have an incentive to substitute private consumption with public expenditure in
order to smooth the path of the more inelastic bundle. Thus in response to a positive
40For this reason even if shocks are symmetric it can happen that cˆft − cˆ∗t 6= 0.
41In fact ρ ≡ CY
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technological shock, they expand more public expenditure than private consumption
producing an unconscious over-expansion of the average union output.
The second channel is given by the incentive of independent governments to in-
fluence the terms of trade in their favour. According to (80), m̂rst between private
consumption and public expenditure do not reflect that of the corresponding m̂rtt as
long as γ 6= σ and ψ > 0 or ν > 042. The reason of this difference is again explained by
the evaluation of the cost of an additional unit home household’s private consumption,
which under no-coordination, internalizes only the effects on home demands43 and not
those on foreign demands. Because of that, even over the business cycle uncoordinated
fiscal policymakers seek to exert their monopoly power on their terms of trade.
If, as a result, under a positive technology shock, there is either an over or under ex-
pansion of output with respect to the case of coordination depends on balance between
these two incentives: namely the incentive to reduce labor effort and the incentive to
increase the government expenditure which if γ < σ 44 generates an additional motive
for an over-expansion of output. According to the impulse responses to a technological
shock, that would be analyzed in what follows, the second effect is prevailing.
Clearly, in general, fiscal policymakers would not be able to reach their target even
under symmetric productivity shocks. Indeed they lack policy instruments and anyway
the monetary authority would seek to correct the average distortionary effects due to
their policy choices. Nevertheless it will turn out that, under symmetric technology
shocks, there is special parametric restriction under which that target can be imple-
mented namely when γ = σ. In fact, in that case there is no motive to substitute
intertemporally between public and private consumption. Thus according to (79)-(81)
gˆft = cˆ
f
t = yˆ
f
t . As consequence, there are no aggregate distortions over the cycles
due the lack of coordination among fiscal policymakers because on the one hand the
inefficiently high dimension of the public sector is not affecting the path of output and
private consumption and on the other hand the the incentive of the fiscal policymakers
to influence the terms of trade over the cycle does not generate aggregate effects 45.
And in fact when γ = σ, if implemented, the target of the uncoordinated governments
coincides with the average target of the common authority under coordination.
Consider now the case of symmetric markup shocks. Symmetric markup shocks af-
fect fiscal policymaker decisions in two ways. First, given an aggregate markup shock,
both average union output and private consumption would contract lowering the de-
mands of foreigners for home produced goods and potentially worsening the terms of
trade of the single small open economy. And, as implicit in (76) and (78), the target of
autonomous government would shift accordingly because the terms of trade worsening
and the lower foreign goods increase the optimal level of leisure and decrease those of
both private and public consumption. Second if shocks are symmetric even the private
consumption and the output of the single small open economy would reduce and the
home country inflation would increase in a way which the uncoordinated fiscal poli-
42i.e. even intermediate or public goods are traded. Note that if ψ > 0 or ν > 0 then δ3 > 0 or δ2 > 0 .
43In particular the average changes over the cycle of this cost is given by (1 − ψ)δ3(yˆft − cˆft ) and (1 −
ψ)(1 − ρ)δ2(gˆft − cˆft ) which embody the average shifts in the home demands of foreigners due to terms of
trade fluctuations.
44Notice in fact that in equilibrium (1− ψ)δ3(yˆft − cˆft ) = (1− ψ)(1− ρ)δ3(gˆft − cˆft ).
45In fact in that case (1− ψ)δ3(yˆft − cˆft ) + (1− ψ)(1− ρ)δ2(yˆft − cˆft ) = 0.
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cymaker perceives as inefficient. Consequently autonomous fiscal policymakers should
trade off between stabilizing inflation and keeping the fluctuations of the marginal rate
of substitution between the private consumption and leisure and and between public
and private consumption and leisure at the desired target. Notice, however, that they
do so without internalizing neither the actions of the other governments nor that of the
monetary authority who as well are trying to offset the negative contraction of average
output and private consumption and the increase of the average inflation. Moreover
they do not recognize as the monetary authority authorities does that the steady state
distortion, which is in fact a distortion only from the monetary union point of view,
generates a motive to stabilize more inflation than output46.
It is can be shown that the set of the first order conditions of fiscal policy problem
can be written as:
piH,t =
1
ϕε
((1− L) + λB(L))
[
−ϕy˜ft − γg˜ft + (1− ψ)−1(ς1 − ψν)c˜ft
]
− λ
ω4ε
B(L)
[
(1− ψ)δρ(−ϕy˜ft − σc˜ft ) + (1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ψν)g˜ft + ς2cˆft
]
(82)
y˜fH,t = (1− ψ)δρc˜tf + (1− ψ)(1− ν)(1− ρ)g˜ft (83)
piH,t = λ
[
ϕy˜fH,t + ω4c˜
f
t
]
+ βEt{piH,t+1}+ λ(µˆt + υ2,t) (84)
piH,t = −ω4∆c˜ft + υ3,t (85)
where B(L) ≡ (1− EtL−1), υ2,t ≡ ϕyˆfH,t + σcˆft + ω4((1− ψ)α+ ψ)(cˆft − cˆ∗t ), υ3,t ≡
pi∗t + ω4(∆cˆ
f
t −∆cˆ∗t ).
This system of equations determines the gaps of the small open economy under
uncoordinated fiscal policies for a given path of the cˆ∗t and pi∗t 47. Condition (83)-(85)
are the constraints of the fiscal policy problem that corresponds to conditions resource
constraint, the Phillips curve and the constraint due to the adoption of a common cur-
rency in terms of gap from the target of the fiscal policymaker. Conversely condition
(82) is derived from the first order conditions with respect to y˜fH,t, g˜
f
t , c˜
f
t and piH,t. This
last condition expresses the trade off among stabilizing at the desired level different
objectives: the home country inflation, the marginal rate of substitution between pri-
vate consumption and leisure and public consumption and leisure. A question arises:
under which conditions the fiscal policymakers choose a policy consistent with home
price stability?
Suppose that the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate in order to
completely stabilize the average union inflation. And at the same time suppose that
shocks are to productivity and symmetric. Then if ψ = 0 and ν = 0 or γ = σ it can
be shown piH,t = 0 for all t is an optimal outcome. To see why this is true notice that
46Why this is true it will be clarified in the next section.
47To recover the average union allocation one has to find the optimal average level of provision of pub-
lic expenditure and then determines the average union private consumption and output using the other
equilibrium conditions: the average union resource constraint, the average union Phillips curve and the IS
curve.
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if ψ = 0 and ν = 0 or γ = σ and shocks are symmetric and to productivity then on
the one hand stabilizing inflation allows to stabilize the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure at the desired level because υ2,t = ϕyˆ
f
H,t + σcˆ
f
t = 0,
on the on other hand there are no changes in the terms of trade so that there is no
additional trade off generated by the adoption of a common currency because υ3,t = 0.
Moreover under these conditions even the marginal rate of substitution between public
consumption and leisure can be stabilize at the desired target.
But this result is conditional on the willingness of the monetary policymaker of
completely stabilize inflation. Whether she finds it optimal or not it will be clarified
in the next paragraph.
5.2 Monetary policy
Under fiscal policy no-coordination the objective of the common central bank can be
approximated as:
−1
2
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
[
ζ3
( ε
λ
(piiH,t)
2 + ϕ(y˜m,iH,t)
2
)
+
(
ρδ(σ − 1) + ζ1ρ− ζ2σ2
)
(c˜m,it )
2
+
(
ζ1ς3 + ζ2(ω4 − ω25 − σ2)
)
(c˜m,it − c˜m,∗t )2 + 2ζ2ω4(c˜m,it − c˜m,∗t )(y˜m,iH,t − y˜m,∗t )
+2ζ2σc˜
m,∗
t y˜
m,∗
t
]
di+ s.o.t.i.m.p.
where x˜m,it ≡ xˆit − xˆm,it and xˆm,it is the target for xˆit chosen by the central bank.
Moreover ζ1 ≡ ((1−ψ)δϕρ+σ)ϕρ+σ , ζ2 ≡ ((1−ψ)δ−1)ρϕρ+σ , ζ3 ≡ ((ϕ+1)(1−ψ)δρ+σ−ρ)ϕρ+σ and ω5 is
properly defined in the appendix.
The objective approximation of the central bank under non-coordinated fiscal poli-
cies diverges from those of the uncoordinated fiscal authority and of the common pol-
icymaker under coordination. And this not only because the central bank does not
choose the optimal provision of the public goods. Indeed even abstracting from this
consideration, there are striking differences in target, weights and variables that enter
in the approximation. The key determinant of these divergences is the steady state
distortion as shown by the dependence of the weights and of the average target from
ρ, ζ1,ζ2 and ζ3.
The target of the central bank for the average union economy can be retrieved from:
ζ3(ϕyˆ
m,∗
t + σcˆ
m,∗
t − (1 + ϕ)a∗t ) + ζ2(
σ
ρ
(yˆm,∗t − cˆm,∗t ) + (1 + ϕ)µˆ∗t ) = 0 (86)
yˆm,∗t = ρcˆ
m,∗
t + (1− ρ)gˆ∗t (87)
Clearly according to (86) and (87) in general, the target of common central bank
is not the first best and therefore does not coincide with the target of the common
authority under coordination. Actually (86) and (87) help to understand the reasons
why the steady state distortion, generated by uncoordinated fiscal policies, affects the
common central bank policy target and her policy decisions.
The first is that, as pointed out by Benigno and Woodford (2004), in general, a non-
efficient steady generates additional cyclical distortions that the central bank should
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try to correct. The source of these distortions has been partially already emphasized
in the previous paragraph. If at the steady state the wedge in the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and private consumption is bigger than one, then the
steady state consumption output ratio is sub-optimally low and the dimension of the
public sector is sub-optimally high. Thus, differently from what happens in the case
coordination, as long as cˆm,∗t 6= yˆm,∗t , the flexible price allocation not efficient. Indeed,
when the percentage change in private consumption is lower (higher) than that of the
government expenditure, ceteris paribus the output would over(under)- expand with
the respect to what would be efficient. As a consequence, according to (86), the target
of the monetary authority has to balance different purposes: on the one hand keeping
the fluctuation of the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and
leisure at the efficient level; on the other hand cooping with the difference between
yˆm,∗t and cˆ
m,∗
t ; closing this gap would allow to eliminate at once the average dynamic
effects of an inefficiently high dimension of the public sector. Indeed the closer yˆm,∗t
are cˆm,∗t the less is the intratemporal substitution between private consumption and
output and the less are the business cycle distortions generated by this substitution.
The second reason is that the cyclical welfare losses due to the steady distortion are
increasing in the mark up shock. Namely differently from the case of coordination the
second order approximation of the objective of the central bank does depend directly
on the correlation between markup shocks and output. A negative markup shock
decreases the inefficiently high wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure generating welfare benefits. This explains why, according to
(86), the central bank considers optimal to increase on average labor effort in response
to a negative markup shocks. In other words, she tries to generate a negative correlation
between the fluctuations of average output and those of the average markup because
this reduces the average union welfare losses. This implies an important consequence:
given a markup shock, under uncoordinated fiscal policy, the central bank finds optimal
to stabilize on average more inflation than output with respect to what the common
authority is willing to do under coordination.
The constraints to the monetary policy problem are:
y˜m,iH,t +
ψ
1− ψ (y˜
m,i
H,t − y˜m,∗t ) = ρc˜tm,i + (δ − 1)ρ(c˜m,it − c˜m,∗t ) (88)
piiH,t = λ
[
ϕy˜m,iH,t + σc˜
m,i
t + ω4((1− ψ)α+ ψ)(c˜m,it − c˜m,∗t )
]
+ βEt{piiH,t+1}
+λ(µˆit + υ5,t) (89)
piiH,t − pi∗t = −ω4(∆c˜m,it −∆c˜m,∗t )− ω4(∆υi4,t −∆υ∗4,t) (90)
where υi4,t ≡ cˆm,it and υ5,t ≡ ϕyˆm,iH,t + σcˆm,it + ω4((1− ψ)α+ ψ)(cˆm,it − cˆm,∗t ). Notice
that given (86) υ∗5,t ≡ −(ζ2σ)/(ζ3ρ)(ym,∗t − cˆm,∗t + (1 + ϕ)µˆ∗t ).
According to (89) and (90) the central bank has to balance the costs of the inflation
with the other two objectives: first keeping the private consumption at its target;
second correcting the dynamic distortion generated by fiscal authorities. This last
objective explains the differences of between the optimal policy decisions under fiscal
policy coordination and no-coordination. Indeed, the simple inspection of the (89)
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gives reason for two results that there will be stressed later on. First, in general, even
if shocks are only to technology, completely stabilizing the average union inflation is
not optimal. A finding this that differs from the findings of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b).
Second, for the reason just discussed, when the average union inflation is completely
stabilized, a mark up shock produces a gap between the actual and the desired marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure that is smaller than under fiscal
policy coordination.
Once integrated the system of optimality conditions of the monetary policymaker
can be rewritten as:
pi∗t = −
ρ(1− L)
ε(σ + ϕρ)
[
ϕy˜m,∗t + σc˜
m,∗
t +
ζ2
ζ3
σ
ρ
(y˜m,∗t − c˜m,∗t )
]
(91)
y˜m,∗t = ρc˜
m,∗
t (92)
pi∗t = λ
[
ϕy˜m,∗t + σc˜
m,∗
t
]
+ βEt{pi∗t+1}+ λ(µˆ∗t + υ∗5,t) (93)
Thanks to this set of equations it is possible to recover the average union allocation
determined by the optimal reaction of the common central bank to given fiscal policies.
Now it is possible to the question posed at the end of last paragraph. In presence of
productivity shocks when does the central bank find optimal to completely stabilize
the average union inflation?
Suppose that according to a policy rule gˆ∗t = cˆ
m,∗
t for all t and there are only tech-
nological shocks. Then pi∗t = 0 for all t satisfies conditions (91),(92)and (93). Namely
when the average union private and public consumptions are perfectly correlated, strict
inflation targeting at the average union level is an optimal monetary policy.
However when gˆ∗t 6= cˆm,∗t for some t, then pi∗t = 0 for all t cannot be optimal. In
that case a policy that completely stabilizes the average inflation does not allow to keep
the average union output and private consumption at the constrained efficient level.
Thus even when there is no trade in public and intermediate goods, namely ν = ψ = 0
the monetary policymaker would not stabilize the average union inflation even under
symmetric productivity shocks, while in that the fiscal policy maker would be willing
to do that.
5.3 The case for average price stability
The analysis of the previous sections allows to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If σ = γ and shocks are to technology, then pi∗t = 0 for all t is an
Nash equilibrium outcome of the monetary and fiscal policy game under fiscal policy
no-coordination. Conversely σ 6= γ and shocks are to technology, then pi∗t = 0 for all
t cannot be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the monetary and fiscal policy game under
fiscal policy no-coordination.
Proof.1 See the appendix
Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows: when γ = σ and shocks are to technol-
ogy, the lack of coordination among fiscal policymakers yields on average only static
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distortions48 namely the steady state distortions. Indeed under this parametric re-
striction and the average union inflation is completely stabilized, two conditions are
simultaneously satisfied. On the one hand the average marginal rates of substitution
between private and public consumption and private consumption and leisure fluctuate
as the marginal rates of transformation between the same variables, i.e. σcˆ∗t − γgˆ∗t = 0
and ϕ(yˆ∗t − aˆ∗t ) + σcˆ∗t = aˆ∗t ; on the other hand the average union output co-move with
the private and public consumption, i.e. yˆ∗t = gˆ∗t = cˆ∗t . These two conditions ensure
that, even if fiscal policies are uncoordinated, under flexible prices, the average union
fluctuations of output, and public and private consumption replicate the fluctuations
that would be achieved if the fiscal policies were coordinated. As a consequence the
monetary authority seeks to remove the only remaining distortion that can be cor-
rected: the average price stickiness. In fact stabilizing completely the average inflation
is optimal: it allows at the same time to eliminate on average the inefficiencies pro-
duced by price rigidities and to keep the average allocation at the constrained-efficient
level.
5.4 The general case
This section analyzes the general case allowing for different intertemporal elasticities
of substitution of private and public consumption and different kinds of shocks. These
differences generates an incentive for the fiscal authorities to seek to substitute in-
tratemporally the public and private consumption. In the case of different elasticities
in order to smooth intertemporally the path of more inelastic goods. In the case of
markup shocks in order to reduce the home country private consumption and output
gap. As a result because of this intratemporal substitution between private and public
consumption, it is no more true that, under technological shocks, the symmetric allo-
cation is proportional to the efficient one. And both monetary and fiscal policies at
the average union level do not correspond to the ones that are optimal under coordina-
tion. In fact neither under technological shocks the common central bank should seek
to pursue price stability nor fiscal policies ensure on average the efficient provision of
public goods.
5.5 Calibration
Impulse responses to a one percent rise in technology and markup are recovered using
the calibration indicated in the appendix which is close to those of Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005b) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005a). In particular γ−1 and ϕ−1 the intertemporal
elasticities of substitution of public consumption and labor, α the degree of openness
in private consumption, ε, the elasticity of substitution among goods produced in the
same country, β the preferences discount factor, θ the parameter that governs the level
of price stickiness in the economy and ac the first order autocorrelation of shocks49
are set according to their calibration. Conversely σ−1 the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of private consumption and η the elasticity of substitution between bundles
produced in different countries is set according to Benigno and Benigno (2006), ψ the
48...at least up to a first order approximation of the optimal policies.
49Both markup and productivity shocks are suppose to be AR(1).
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degree of openness in the intermediate goods is equal to α and ν = 0.2 as partially
suggested by Bru¨lhart and Trionfetti (2004). Finally χ the parameter that regulates
the relative weight of the public good in the preferences is calibrated to match the
average consumption output ratio of European Monetary Union.
The baseline calibration is described in the appendix an it is close to those of Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005b), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005a). In particular αs the degree of
openness of the small open economies, ε, the elasticity of substitution among goods
produced in the same country, β the preferences discount factor, θ the parameter that
governs the level of price stickiness in the economy and ac the first order autocorrelation
of shocks50 are set according to their calibration. Conversely σ the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of private consumption and η the elasticity of substitution
between bundles produced in different countries and αb, the degree of openness of the
areas are set according to Pappa (2004).
5.6 Dynamic Simulations
The appendix shows the impulse responses to a one percent increase in aggregate
technology and markup that can be interpreted as follows.
When shocks are to technology and fiscal policies are coordinated, the optimal pol-
icy mix embodies two clear prescriptions for the average union economy: the nominal
interest rate should be set to completely stabilize the average inflation while on aver-
age the fluctuations in the government expenditure should ensure an efficient provision
of the public goods. These policies allow to close on average all the gaps and reach
the efficient fluctuations. However under fiscal policy no-coordination none of these
prescriptions is still valid. The first is not valid because of dynamic effects produced
by fiscal policy no-coordination. In particular, given that γ < σ the technology shock
leads to an expansion of the provision of the public goods greater than that of con-
sumption which, because of the inefficiently high dimension of the public sector and
the incentive of uncoordinated fiscal policymakers to influence the terms of trade in
their favor, implies an overexpansion of output. Thus, the central bank has to trade off
between stabilizing the average union inflation and reducing the output. This explain
why the monetary policy generates average union deflation, being more restrictive un-
der no-coordination that under coordination as emphasized by the different path of
the nominal interest rates. Obviously in this situation not even the average public
good provision is efficient. Even over the cycle fiscal policymakers choose their policy
disregarding the aggregate distortions that their joint action produces. Thus, they take
their policy decisions without internalizing the fact that by expanding the government
expenditure more than private consumption they are overexpanding output with re-
spect to what would be efficient from the monetary union perspective. And in fact
they choose the provision of the public goods trading off between stabilizing the home
inflation and keeping marginal the rate of substitution between private consumption
and leisure and between public consumption and leisure at the desired target. A target
that embodies the incentive to try to influence the terms of trade in their favor. Indeed
the fact that according to the impulse responses the government expenditure expan-
sion is greater than σ/γ that of private consumption can be explained as a consequence
50Both markup and productivity shocks are suppose to be AR(1).
27
of this incentive for which public goods provision is used to generate a term of trade
improvement through a reduction in private consumption.
When shocks are to the markup, the policy prescriptions under coordination are
twofold. Fiscal policy is not a useful tool to stabilize the average effects of the markup
shocks: for this purpose it is more efficient to use the nominal interest rate which is
a costless instrument. Therefore under markup shocks, the average union government
expenditure should be kept at the steady state level. At the same time, the monetary
authority should trade off between stabilizing inflation and closing the output gap given
the consequences of an inefficient shock to the mark up. The policy prescriptions under
no-coordination are quite different. First because in response to a positive markup
shock the optimal monetary policy is more restrictive under no-coordination than under
coordination. Indeed from the average union perspective positive a markup shock does
not only lead to an inefficient reduction of output and consumption and an increase
in inflation by affecting firms decisions. As made clear by (86), it even increases the
relevant welfare costs of the fluctuations due to the steady state distortion because it
rises the already inefficient wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and private consumption. As a result, the common central bank wants to generate a
negative correlation between average union output fluctuations and the markup shocks
in order to decrease the welfare losses. Thus she has an incentive to stabilize more the
average inflation rather than the average output. This explains why, according to the
impulse responses, the nominal interest rate under-coordination is higher under no-
coordination than under coordination, while the average inflation and output are lower
under no-coordination. Second, because autonomous governments lower the provision
of public goods. This is the result of the balance between different objectives. On the
one hand the given that the markup shock is aggregate, the fall of the average union
private consumption and output decrease the demands of foreign for home produced
goods and potentially worsens the terms of trade. In response to these external shocks
the non-coordinated policymaker would like to allow for an increase in the home leisure
and a decrease in home private and public consumption51. However she has to trade
off between this purpose and stabilizing the rise of home inflation and the decrease of
home output due to the internal markup shock that she perceives as inefficient. Thus
the provision of public good falls but not much more than the private consumption in
order to diminish the reduction of the private consumption itself that actually after
the first periods is higher than under coordination. Thus, while under coordination,
the common authority recognizes that only the monetary policy should be used to
stabilize the average effects of markup shocks, under no-coordination the single country
government takes as given the actions of the other policymakers and tries on her own
to stabilize the effects of the markup shock in her own country.
6 Conclusion
According to this paper the lack of coordination among policymakers has relevant
normative implications in a monetary union. In fact, only under a special parametric
restriction and when shocks are to technology, fiscal policy no-coordination does not
51This is made clear by the (76)-(78).
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matter for the optimal monetary policy design. However, in general, this result in not
verified and as opposed to the case of coordination under no-coordination it is possible
to reach the following conclusions: first when shocks are to technology, stabilizing
the average union prices is not optimal; second under markup shocks, the monetary
authority is mainly focused on the stabilization of the average union inflation. Finally
even if shocks are symmetric, fiscal policies are used as stabilization tool.
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A Proof of proposition 1
First part of the proof. If γ = σ for all t then it can be shown that g˜f,∗t = c˜
f,∗
t = y˜
f,∗
t
pi∗t = 0 satisfies the average of conditions (82)-(85). Then gˆ∗t = cˆ∗t = yˆ∗t which implies
that g˜m,∗t = c˜
m,∗
t = y˜
m,∗
t = 0.
The second part of the proof can be obtained by contradiction. If pi∗t = 0 for all
t, then by (91) and (93) cˆm,∗t = yˆ
m,∗
t which implies that cˆ
∗
t = gˆ
∗
t . However cˆ
∗
t = gˆ
∗
t
is consistent with the average of conditions (82)-(85) only if only if γ = σ which
contradicts our initial hypothesis.
B The zero inflation deterministic steady states
B.1 The policy problem under coordination
Under coordination, the policy maker maximizes the following lagragian with respect
to Cit , G
i
t, Y
i
t , Y
i
H,t, Z
i
t , K
i
t , F
i
t and Π
i
H,t for all i and t:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
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di
where P it /P
i
C,t, P
i
G,t/P
i
C,t, P
i
H,t/P
i
t , C
∗
t , ΥC,t, ΥG,t and ΥY,t are determined accord-
ing (35), (36), (37), (33) and (45) and Z−1 = 1According to the first order conditions
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evaluated at the zero inflation symmetric non-stochastic steady state:
C−σ = λc1 − λc4σY C−σ−1
χG−γ = λc1
λc1 = λ
c
2
Y ϕ = λc2 − λc3(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ)(1 + µ)
ε
ε− 1 − λ
c
4C
−σ
Y ϕ+1 = −λc3ϕY ϕ+1 + λc6(1− θ)
λc3(1− θ) = λc5
λc4(1− θ) = −λc5
λc3θεK = −λc4θ(ε− 1)F + λc5
θ
1− θK
If (1− τ) = (1/(1 + µ))(ε− 1)/ε52, this system of equations jointly with (38), (43),
(44), (50), (51), (52), and (53) can be satisfied by the following solution:
C−σ = Y ϕ
χG−γ = Y ϕ
Y = C +G
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1
1− θ (1− τ)(1 + µ)
ε
ε− 1
YH = Y ΠH = 1 Z = 1
λc1 = Y
ϕ λc2 = λ
c
1 λ
c
3 = −λc4 =
λc5
1− θ = 0 λ
c
6 =
Y ϕ
1− θ λ
c
7 = 0
B.2 The fiscal policy problem under no-coordination
The fiscal policy makers maximize the following lagrangian with respect to Ct, Gt,
Yt, YH,t, Zt, Kt, Ft and ΠH,t :
52Namely if even τ is chosen optimally in such a way λ3 = −λ4 = 0
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Cσηt Υ
1−ση
Y,t
)]
+λf3,t
[
Kt −
(
YH,t
At
)ϕ+1
Zϕt (1− τ)(1 + µt)
ε
ε− 1
]
− λf3,t−1θΠεH,tKt
+λf4,t
[
Ft − YH,tC−σt
Pt
PC,t
PH,t
Pt
]
− λf4,t−1θΠ(ε−1)H,t Ft
+λf5,t
Ft −Kt(1− θΠε−1H,t1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+λf6,t
Zt − θZt−1ΠεH,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1H,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

+λf7,t
[(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ (C∗t−1
C∗t
)−σ
Π∗t −
PC,t
Pt
Pt
PH,t
ΠH,t
PH,t−1
Pt−1
Pt−1
PC,t−1
]}
where Pt/PC,t, PG,t/PC,t and PH,t/Pt are determined according (35), (36) and (37)
and C∗t , ΥC,t, ΥG,t and ΥY,t are taken as given. According to first order conditions
evaluated at the zero inflation symmetric non-stochastic steady state:
C−σ = λf1(δ1 + δ2
ρ
1− ρ) + λ
f
2(1− ψ)δ3
1
ρ
− λf4Y C−σ[C−1σ + (ω4 − 1)] + λf7
(1− β)
C
[σ − (ω4 − 1)]
χG−γ = λf1
λf1 = λ
f
2(1− ψ)
Y ϕ = λf2 − λf3(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ)(1 + µ)
ε
ε− 1 − λ
f
4C
−σ
Y ϕ+1 = −λf3ϕY ϕ+1 + λf6(1− θ)
λf3(1− θ) = λf5
λf4(1− θ) = −λf5
λf3θεK = −λf4θ(ε− 1)F + λf5
θ
1− θK − λ
f
7
If (1−τ) = ((1/(1+µ))(ε−1)/ε)(1−ψ) [δ1 + δ2GC + δ3 YC ]53 this system of equations
jointly with (38), (43), (44), (50), (51), (52), and (53) can be satisfied by the following
53Namely if even τ is chosen to maximize the objective of the fiscal policy maker ensuring λf3 = 0.
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solution:
C−σ = (1− ψ)
[
δ1 + δ2
G
C
+ δ3
Y
C
]
Y ϕ
χG−γ = (1− ψ)(1− ν)Y ϕ
Y = C +G
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1
1− θ (1 + µ)(1− τ)
ε
ε− 1
YH = Y ΠH = 1 Z = 1
λf1 = (1− ψ)Y ϕ λf2 = Y ϕ λf3 = −λf4 =
λf5
1− θ = 0 λ
f
6 =
Y ϕ+1
1− θ λ
f
7 = 0
B.3 The monetary policy problem under no-coordination
The monetary policy maker maximizes with respect to Cit , Y
i
t , Y
i
H,t, Z
i
t , K
i
t , F
i
t and
ΠiH,t for all i and t the following lagragian:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
{Cit1−σ
1− σ + χ
Git
1−γ
1− γ −
1
ϕ+ 1
(
Y iH,tZ
i
t
Ait
)ϕ+1
+λi,m1,t
[
Y it −
(
P it
P iC,t
)−η (
(1− α)Cit + αCiσηt Υ1−σηC,t + (1− ν)
(
P iC,t
P iG,t
)−η
Git + νC
iση
t Υ
1−ση
G,t
)]
+λi,m2,t
[
Y iH,t −
(
P iH,t
P it
)−η (
(1− ψ)Y it + ψ
(
P it
P iC,t
)−η
Ci
ση
t Υ
1−ση
Y,t
)]
+λi,m3,t
Kit −
(
Y iH,t
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ(1− τ)(1 + µit)
ε
ε− 1
− λi,m3,t−1θΠiH,tεKit
+λi,m4,t
[
F it − Y iH,tCi−σt
P it
P iC,t
P iH,t
P it
]
− λi,m4,t−1θΠiH,t
(ε−1)
F it
+λi,m5,t
F it −Kit
(
1− θΠiH,tε−1
1− θ
) 1
ε−1

+λi,m6,t
Zit − θZit−1ΠiεH,t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠiH,tε−1
1− θ
) ε
ε−1

+λi,m7,t
[(
Cit
Cit−1
)−σ (C∗t−1
C∗t
)−σ
Π∗t −
P iC,t
P it
P it
P iH,t
ΠiH,t
P iH,t−1
P it−1
P it−1
P iC,t−1
]}
di
where P it /P
i
C,t, P
i
G,t/P
i
C,t, P
i
H,t/P
i
t , C
∗
t , ΥC,t, ΥG,t and ΥY,t are determined accord-
ing (35), (36), (37), (33) and (45) Git is taken as given for all i and t and Z−1 = 1
35
. According to the first order conditions evaluated at the zero inflation symmetric
non-stochastic steady state:
C−σ = λm1 − λm4 σY C−σ−1
λm1 = λ
m
2
Y ϕ = λm2 − λm3 (ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ(1− τ)(1 + µ)
ε
ε− 1 − λ
m
4 C
−σ
Y ϕ+1 = −λm3 ϕY ϕ+1 + λm6 (1− θ)
λm3 (1− θ) = λm5
λm4 (1− θ) = −λm5
λm3 θεK = −λm4 θ(ε− 1)F + λm5
θ
1− θK
It easy to show that if (1 − τ) = ((1/(1 + µ))(ε − 1)/ε)(1 − ψ) [δ1 + δ2GC + δ3 YC ]
this system of equations jointly with (38), (43), (44), (50), (51), (52), and (53) can be
satisfied by the following solution:
C−σ = (1− ψ)
[
δ1 + δ2
G
C
+ δ3
Y
C
]
Y ϕ
Y = C +G
F = K =
Y C−σ
1− θ =
Y ϕ+1
1− θ (1 + µ)(1− τ)
ε
ε− 1
YH = Y ΠH = 1 Z = 1
λm1 = Y
ϕ
[
C
Y
δϕ+ σ
]/[C
Y
ϕ+ σ
]
λm2 = λ
m
1
λm3 = −λm4 =
λm5
1− θ =
C
Y
(δ − 1)
δ
/[C
Y
ϕ+ σ
]
λm6 =
Y ϕ+1(1− ϕλm4 )
1− θ λ
m
7 = 0
B.4 A purely quadratic approximation of policy makers’
objectives
In order to recover the optimal policies we need to approximate up to the second order
single country representative agent utility given by (??) in the following way.
First we can approximate the utility derived from private consumption as:
C1−σt
1− σ '
C1−σ
1− σ + C
1−σ(cˆt +
1
2
cˆ2t )−
σ
2
C1−σ cˆ2t + t.i.p. (94)
where cˆt stands for the log-deviations of private consumption from the steady state54.
54From now this convention will be used: xˆt represents the log-deviation of Xt from the steady state.
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Similarly the utility derived from the consumption of public goods can be approxi-
mated:
G1−γt
1− γ '
G1−γ
1− γ +G
1−γ(gˆt +
1
2
gˆ2t )−
γ
2
G1−γ gˆ2t + t.i.p. (95)
The labor disutility can be approximated by taking into account that Nt =
YH,tZt
At
and,
as showed by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005b), being Zt =
∫ 1
0
(
pH,t(k)
PH,t
)−ε
dk:
zˆt ' ε2V ark(pH,t(k)) (96)
In words the approximation of Zt around the symmetric steady state is purely quadratic.
Moreover following Woodford (2001, NBER WP8071) it is possible to show that
∞∑
t=0
βtV ark(pH,t(k)) = 1λ
∞∑
t=0
βtpi2H,t with λ ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ . Thus:
1
ϕ+ 1
(
YtZt
At
)ϕ+1
' 1
ϕ+ 1
Y ϕ+1 + Y ϕ+1(yˆH,t +
1
2
yˆ2H,t) + Y
ϕ+1 ε
2λ
(piH,t)2 +
ϕ
2
Y ϕ+1yˆ2H,t
−(ϕ+ 1)Y ϕ+1yˆH,tat + t.i.p. (97)
The welfare approximation under coordination
Under coordination, at the steady state, the fiscal authority chooses to produce the
efficient level of public goods. Therefore C−σ = χG−γ = Y ϕ which implies that the
second order approximation of the average union welfare can be rewritten as:
∞∑
t=0
βtY ϕ+1E0
∫ 1
0
[
sˆi
′
t zs −
1
2
sˆi
′
t Zs,ssˆ
i
t + sˆ
i′
t Zs,aaˆ
i
t
]
+ t.i.p. (98)
where
sˆ′t ≡
[
yˆiH,t, gˆ
i
t, cˆ
i
t, pi
i
H,t
]
z
′
s ≡ [−1, ρ, (1− ρ), 0]
Zs,s ≡

(ϕ+ 1) 0 0 0
0 (γ − 1)(1− ρ) 0 0
0 0 (σ − 1)ρ 0
0 0 0 ελ

Zs,a ≡
 (1 + ϕ)0
0

Again it is possible to substitute the linear quadratic terms of (94) by using the second
order approximation of the resource constraints namely:
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0 ' −
∫ 1
0
yˆitdi−
1
2
∫ 1
0
yˆi2t di+
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′ hs +
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆi
′
t Hs,ssˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′HS,S
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi+ t.i.p. (99)
0 '
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′ ps +
∫ 1
0
yˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
yˆi2t di+
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆi
′
t Ps,ssˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆitdiPS,S
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
0
yˆitPy,ssˆ
i
tdi
+
∫ 1
0
yˆitdiPY,S
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi+ t.i.p. (100)
where
h′s ≡ [0, (1− ρ), ρ, 0]
Hs,s ≡

0 0 0 0
0 (1− ρ) ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0
0 ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) ρ+ ω1ρ+ ω2(1− ρ) 0
0 0 0 0

HS,S ≡

0 0 0 0
0 0 −ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0
0 −ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) −ω1ρ− ω2(1− ρ) 0
0 0 0 0

p
′
s ≡ [−1, 0, 0, 0] Py,s ≡
[
0 0 ξψ 0
]
PY,S ≡
[
0 0 −ξψ 0 ]
Ps,s ≡

−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 ω3 0
0 0 0 0
 PS,S ≡

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 −ω3 0
0 0 0 0

where
ξ ≡ ησ
1− α
ω1 ≡ αη σ (σ − (1− α) α (1− η σ))
(1− α)2
ω2 ≡ η ν σ ((ν − 1) + (σ − 1)− (1− 2 η) (1− ν) ν σ − α (ν − 2) (1 + (1− η) σ)− (1− η) σν)
(1− α)2
ω3 ≡ −
(
η σ ψ ((1− α− α (1− η) σ) (1− ψ) (2− ψ)− σ (1 + η (1− ψ) ψ))
(1− α)2 (1− ψ)2
)
Given (115) and (116) it is easy to show that:
0 '
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′ rs +
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆi
′
t Rs,ssˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′RS,S
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi+ t.i.p. (101)
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where
rs ≡ ps + hs Rs,s ≡ Ps,s +Hs,s + hyPy,s + P ′y,sh′y
RS,S ≡ PS,S +HS,S + hY Py,s + P ′y,sh′Y + hsPY,S + P ′Y,Sh′s
(102)
and
h
′
y ≡ [0, (1− ν)(1− ρ), δ1ρ+ δ2(1− ρ), 0] h
′
Y ≡ [0, ν(1− ρ), ρ− δ1ρ− δ2(1− ρ), 0]
where ς1 ≡ ξ(ψ + ν) ς3 ≡ ρω1 + (1− ρ)ω2 + ω3 + 2ξψ(ρδ1 + (1− ρ)δ2)
Given that
zs = rs (103)
under coordination, the second order approximation to the average union welfare
can be rewritten as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆi
′
t Ωs,ssˆ
i
tdi−
1
2
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′ΩS,S
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi+
∫ 1
0
sˆi
′
t Ωs,aaˆ
i
tdi+
∫ 1
0
sˆitdi
′ΩS,A
∫ 1
0
aˆitdi
]
+t.i.p. (104)
where
Ωs,s ≡ Zs,s +Rs,s ΩS,S ≡ RS,S
Ωs,a ≡ Zs,a
are equal to:
Ωs,s =

ϕ 0 0 0
0 γ(1− ρ) (1− ρ)(1− ν)ς1 0
0 (1− ρ)(1− ν)ς1 σρ+ ς3 0
0 0 0 ελ

ΩS,S =
 0 −(1− ρ)(1− ν)ς1 0−(1− ρ)(1− ν)ς1 −ς3 0
0 0 0

The welfare for the fiscal authority under no-coordination
By combining (94),(95) and (97) and considering that at the steady state C−σ =
(1 − ψ)δY ϕand χG−γ = (1 − ψ)(1 − ν)Y ϕ the second order approximation of single
country representative agent welfare can be written in matrix notation as:
∞∑
t=0
βtY ϕ+1E0
[
sˆ′tws −
1
2
sˆ′tWs,ssˆt + sˆ
′
tWs,eeˆt
]
+ t.i.f.p. (105)
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where
sˆ′t ≡ [yˆH,t, gˆt, cˆt, piH,t] w
′
s ≡ [−1, (1− ψ)(1− ν)(1− ρ), (1− ψ)δρ, 0] eˆ
′
t ≡ [yˆ∗t , gˆ∗t , cˆ∗t , at]
Ws,s ≡

(ϕ+ 1) 0 0 0
0 (γ − 1)(1− ψ)(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0 0
0 0 (σ − 1)(1− ψ)δρ 0
0 0 0 ελ

Ws,e ≡
 0 0 0 (1 + ϕ)0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

and with yˆ∗t ≡
∫ 1
0 yˆ
j
t dj, gˆ
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
0 gˆ
j
t dj and cˆ
∗
t ≡
∫ 1
0 cˆ
j
tdj. This approximation can be
written in purely quadratic way by using the second order approximation of the single
country market clearing conditions (43) and (44). In particular notice that the second
order approximation of these constraints can be read as:
0 ' [−yˆt − 12 yˆ2t + sˆ′tfs − eˆ′tfe + 12 sˆ′tFs,ssˆt − sˆ′tFs,eet]+ s.o.t.i.f.p. (106)
0 '
[
sˆ′tιs − eˆ′tιe + yˆtιy + 12 yˆ2t ιy + 12 sˆ
′
tIs,ssˆt − sˆ′tIs,eeˆt + yˆtIy,ssˆt − yˆtIy,eeˆt
]
+ s.o.t.i.f.p.
(107)
where
f
′
s ≡ [0, (1− ν)(1− ρ), δ1ρ+ δ2(1− ρ), 0] f
′
e ≡ [0, −ν(1− ρ), −ρ+ (δ1ρ+ δ2(1− ρ)), 0]
Fs,s ≡

0 0 0 0
0 (1− ν)(1− ρ) ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0
0 ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) δ1ρ+ δ2(1− ρ) + ω1ρ+ ω2(1− ρ) 0
0 0 0 0

Fs,e ≡

0 0 0 0
0 0 ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0
0 −ξν(1− ρ) ω1ρ+ ω2(1− ρ) + ξν(2− ν)(1− ρ) 0
0 0 0 0

ι
′
s ≡ [−1, 0, (1− ψ)δ3, 0] ι
′
e ≡ [−ψ, 0, (1− ψ)δ3, 0] ιy ≡ [(1− ψ)]
Is,s ≡

−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− ψ)δ3 + ω3 0
0 0 0 0
 Is,e ≡

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
− ξψ(1−ψ) 0 ω3 + ξψ(2−ψ)(1−ψ) 0
0 0 0 0

Iy,s ≡
[
0 0 ξψ 0
]
Iy,e ≡
[
0 0 ξψ 0
]
Given (106), (107) an be rewritten as:
0 ' sˆ′t (ιs + (1− ψ)fs)− eˆ
′
t(ιe + (1− ψ)fe) +
1
2
sˆ
′
t
(
Is,s + (1− ψ)Fs,s + fsIy,s + I ′y,sf ′s
)
sˆt
−sˆ′t [Is,e + (1− ψ)Fs,e + fsIy,e + feIy,s] eˆt + s.o.t.i.f.p. (108)
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Again thanks to conditions (73), (74) and (75) it follows that:
ws = ιs + (1− ψ)fs (109)
Therefore by using (108), (105) can be approximated as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
− 1
2
s
′
tΩs,sst + s
′
tΩs,eet
]
+ t.i.f.p. (110)
which is purely quadratic and where Ωs,s ≡ Ws,s + Is,s + (1 − ψ)Fs,s + fsIy,s + I ′y,sf ′s
and Ωs,e ≡Ws,e + Is,e + (1− ψ)Fs,e + fsIy,e + feIy,s are respectively equal to:
ϕ 0 0 0
0 γ(1− ρ)(1− ν)(1− ψ) (1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ξνψ) 0
0 (1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ξνψ) (1− ψ)ρσδ + ς2 0
0 0 0 ελ
 (111)

0 0 0 1 + ϕ
0 0 (1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ξνψ) 0
−(1− ψ)δ3 −(1− ρ)(1− ψ)δ2 + (1− ρ)(1− ν)(ς1 − ξνψ) (1− ψ)((1− ρ)δ2 + δ3) + ς2 0
0 0 0 0

(112)
with δ ≡ δ1 + (1−ρ)ρ δ2 + 1ρδ3, ς1 ≡ ξ(ν + ψ) ς2 ≡ (1 − ψ)(ω1ρ + ω2(1 − ρ)) + ω3 +
2ξψ(ρδ1 + (1− ρ)δ2).
B.5 The welfare approximation for the monetary author-
ity
The central bank of the monetary union maximizes:
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
∫ 1
0
[
Cit
1−σ
1− σ + χ
Git
1−γ
1− γ −
N it
ϕ+1
ϕ+ 1
]
di 0 < β < 1 (113)
By combining (94) and (97) and given that C−σ = (1 − ψ)δY ϕ, the second order
approximation of (113) can be written as:
∞∑
t=0
βtY ϕ+1E0
∫ 1
0
[
lˆi
′
t wl −
1
2
lˆi
′
t Wl,l lˆ
i
t + lˆ
i′
t Wl,uuˆ
i
t
]
di+ t.i.m.p. (114)
where
lˆi
′
t ≡
[
yˆiH,t, cˆ
i
t, pˆi
i
H,t
]
uˆi
′
t ≡
[
gˆit, a
i
t, µ
i
t
]
w′l ≡ [−1, (1− ψ)δρ, 0]
Wl,l ≡
 (ϕ+ 1) 0 00 (σ − 1)(1− ψ)δρ 0
0 0 ελ
 Wl,u ≡
 0 (ϕ+ 1) 00 0 0
0 0 0

and t.i.m.p. stands for terms independent of monetary policy inclusive of the gov-
ernment expenditure. In order to express that approximation in a purely quadratic
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way, it is necessary to recover the second order approximations of (43), (44), (52), (48)
and (49). By integrating the first two approximation we obtain:
0 ' −
∫ 1
0
yˆitdi−
1
2
∫ 1
0
yˆi2t di+
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′ fl −
∫ 1
0
uˆitdi
′ fu +
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Fl,l lˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆitdj
′FL,L
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
−
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Fl,uuˆ
i
tdi−
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t diFL,U
∫ 1
0
uˆitdi+ s.o.t.i.m.p. (115)
0 '
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′ ιl +
∫ 1
0
yˆitdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
yˆi2t di+
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Il,l lˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′IL,L
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi+
∫ 1
0
yˆitIy,l lˆ
i
tdi
+
∫ 1
0
yˆitdiIY,L
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi+ s.o.t.i.m.p. (116)
where
f ′l ≡ [0, ρ, 0] f ′u ≡ [−(1− ρ), 0, 0]
Fl,l ≡
 0 0 00 ρ+ ω1ρ+ ω2(1− ρ) 0
0 0 0
 Fl,u ≡
 0 0 0−ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0 0
0 0 0

FL,L ≡
 0 0 00 −ω1ρ− ω2(1− ρ) 0
0 0 0
 FL,U ≡
 0 0 0ξν(1− ν)(1− ρ) 0 0
0 0 0

ι
′
l ≡ [−1, 0, 0] Iy,l ≡
[
0 ξψ 0
]
IY,L ≡
[
0 −ξψ 0 ]
Il,l ≡
 −1 0 00 ω3 0
0 0 0
 IL,L ≡
 0 0 00 −ω3 0
0 0 0

Given (115) and (116) it is easy to show that:
0 '
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′ rl −
∫ 1
0
uˆitdi
′ ru +
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Rl,l lˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′RL,L
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
−
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Rl,uu
i
tdi−
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t diRL,U
∫ 1
0
uitdi+ s.o.t.i.m.p. (117)
where
rl ≡ ιl + fl ru ≡ fu
Rl,l ≡ Il,l + Fl,l + fyIy,l + I ′y,lf ′y RL,L ≡ IL,L + FL,L + fY Iy,l + I ′y,lfY + flIY,L + I ′Y,Lf ′l
Rl,u ≡ Fl,u + I ′y,lf ′g RL,U ≡ FL,U + fGIy,l + I ′Y,Lf ′u (118)
and
f
′
y ≡ [0, δ1ρ+ δ2(1− ρ), 0] f
′
Y ≡ [0, ρ− δ1ρ− δ2(1− ρ), 0]
f
′
g ≡ [−(1− ν)(1− ρ), 0] f
′
G ≡ [−ν(1− ρ), 0]
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By combining the second order approximation of the (52), (50) and (51) as in Benigno
and Woodford (2004), we obtain the following condition:
V0 =
1− θ
θ
(1− βθ)
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′vl −
∫ 1
0
uˆi
′
t vu +
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Vl,l lˆ
i
tdi+
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′VL,L
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
−
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Vl,uuˆ
i
tdi
]
+ s.o.t.i.m.p. (119)
where
v′l ≡ [ϕ, σ, 0] v′u ≡ [0, (ϕ+ 1), −1]
Vl,l ≡
 ϕ(ϕ+ 2) ω4 0ω4 −ω24 + ω5 0
0 0 ε(ϕ+1)λ
 Vl,u ≡
 0 (ϕ+ 1)2 −(ϕ+ 1)0 0 0
0 0 0

VL,L ≡
 0 σ − ω4 0σ − ω4 −σ2 + ω24 − ω5 0
0 0 0

with
ω5 ≡ −σ ψ (−1 + (1− η) σ (1 + α (1− ψ)) + α (1− ψ) + (1− σ) ψ)
(1− α)2 (1− ψ)2
+
ασ (1− α (1− σ)− (1− η) σ)
(1− α)2
ω4 ≡ σ(1− α) (1− ψ) λ ≡
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
Conditions (117) and (120) allow to substitute the linear term of the union welfare
approximation with purely quadratic terms. In fact given these conditions:
0 ' Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[ ∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′(ζ1rl + ζ2vl) +
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t (ζ1Rl,l + ζ2Vl,l)lˆ
i
tdi−
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t (ζ1Rl,u + ζ2Vl,u)uˆ
i
tdi
+
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′(ζ1RL,L + ζ2VL,L)
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi−
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′(ζ1RL,U )
∫ 1
0
uˆitdi
]
+ t.i.m.p. (120)
where ζ1 ≡ (1−ψ)δϕρ+σϕρ+σ and ζ2 ≡ ((1−ψ)δ−1)ρϕρ+σ . It is easy to show that:
wl = ζ1rl + ζ2vl (121)
Hence we can write the second order approximation of union welfare as:
Y ϕ+1
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Ωl,l lˆ
i
tdi−
1
2
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′ΩL,L
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi+
∫ 1
0
lˆi
′
t Ωl,uuˆ
i
tdi+
∫ 1
0
lˆitdi
′ΩL,U
∫ 1
0
uˆitdi
]
+t.i.m.p. (122)
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where
Ωl,l ≡Wl,l + ζ1Rl,l + ζ2Vl,l ΩL,L ≡ ζ1RL,L + ζ2VL,L
Ωl,u ≡Wl,u + ζ1Rl,u + ζ2Vl,u ΩL,U ≡ ζ1RL,U (123)
are equal to:
Ωl,l =
 ϕζ3 ζ2ω4 0ζ2ω4 δ(σ − 1)(1− ψ)ρ+ ζ1(ρ+ ς3) + ζ2(ω5 − ω24) 0
0 0 εζ3λ

ΩL,L =
 0 ζ2(σ − ω4) 0ζ2(σ − ω4) −ζ1ς3 − ζ2(σ2 + ω5 − ω24) 0
0 0 0

Ωl,u =
 0 (ϕ+ 1)ζ3 −(ϕ+ 1)ζ2−ζ1(1− ν)(1− ρ)ς1 0 0
0 0 0
 ΩL,U =
 0 0 0ζ1(1− ν)(1− ρ)ς1 0 0
0 0 0

with ζ3 ≡ 1 + (ϕ+ 1)ζ2 and ς3 ≡ ρω1 + (1− ρ)ω2 + ω3 + 2ξψ(ρδ1 + (1− ρ)δ2).
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